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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

~rr1\TE

OF UTAH,
Plain.tiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case
No. 9380

IJ~\ WRENCE

ALBERT HORNE,
Defendant and Appella.nt.

BRIEF OF RESP·O·NDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent makes the following statement of
facts, and adopts the appellant's nomenclature for designating the citations to the record.
The prosecutrix, Shirley Pies, 1s a 20-year-old
mother of t'Yo minor children (T. 7) who resided ""ith
her children, ages ~ and 3 ( T. 8) in a house trailer located in Hammond's Trailer Court, Clearfield, Utah. At
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the time of the incident her husband, a serviceman, was
overseas in the Philippine Islands.
On the night of June 14, 1960, at about 10 :30 p.m.,
Mrs. Pies went to bed in her house trailer, placing her
two-year-old daughter in bed with her, and her threeyear-old son in another bedroom adjacent to her. (T. 8)
Since the night was warm, she left the doors to the trailer
open. At some time after midnight she was awakened
by the defendant ringing her doorbell. The defendant
entered the trailer without being invited. (T. 9) The
trailer was not lighted, but the defendant had been in
the trailer with his girl friend, also an acquaintance of
the prosecutrix, the night before. The defendant had
met the prosecutrix prior to the 14th of June, and had
visited at the trailer before. ( T. 17) Upon entering the
trailer the defendant opened the refrigerator, and asked
the prosecutrix if she had any ''coke.'' She replied she did
not, and then indicated that Bonnie Lee, the defendant's
girlfriend, was not in the trailer. (R. 10) The defendant
indicated he came for the prosecutrix, not Bonnie Lee.
He entered the bedroom, took off his pants, and announced
his intention to make love to :1fr~. Pies. Defendant proceeded to climb on the bed \Yhere

~irs.

Pies and her child

were in an attempt to haYe intercourse \Yith her.

~Irs.

Pies' testimony makes it clear that she struggled and
resisted for some time to deter the defendant from raping her. (T. 11) She testified:
''A. My little girl was at the head of the bed, on
the right of me. l\fy little boy "~as asleep in
the other bedroom.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q. Will you relatP the events then, after he
.A..

came to the bed, 1\tf rs. Pies'? As you best remember them?
l-Ie kept trying to put his hands on me, and
kept trying to put his mouth on me. And I
kPpt pushing him a\vay, and struggling \vith
him. ~[y little girl woke up and she started to
cr~~, and she kept saying she wanted a drink
of \Vater, and finally I told Larry: 'Please, I
have got to go to the bathroom.' I thought
if I got to the bathroom that he'd think I had
locked the door and he'd leave, but there
wasn't a lock on the bathroom door.
I was in the bathroom about 10 or 15 minutes,
and he kept telling me to come out, and I told
him I wasn't going to, and then he opened the
bathroom door. He found out it wasn't locked,
and he came to the bathroom door and opened
it, and he pulled me out of the bathroom and
into the bedroom.

Q. What happened after you were taken back
to the bedroom?
A. Well, we struggled for quite a while more,
and Larry kept throwing me on the bed, and
I "~ould manage to get away from him, and
then he \vould pull me back, and I couldn't
get a'vay from him.

Q.
.A...

Was anything happening to your clothing during this time, ~Irs. Pies u?
Oh, he pulled my slip do\vn, do,vn to my waist,
and he tried to take my pants off, and I had
ahold of my pants with one hand, and he
pulled them off of me. I couldn't hold them up.

Q.

..A.nd after he had your pants off, \Yhat happened then·?
.A.. Then he thre"~ me back on the bed. And I \vas
so tired, and my little girl kept crying for a
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drink of water, aud at one tiu~e my head hit
her in the stomach, and I said: 'Stop it. You're
hurting my little girl,' and he said: 'I'm not
hurting you. If you'd quit fighting me,' he
said, 'then none of this would happen.'

Q. Did you continue to struggle 1
A. Yes, I did. I begged him to let me go, and
he wouldn't. He wouldn't leave me alone.
Q. What happened after that, Mrs. Pies'
A. Well, after this he got me on the bed, and I
don't know exactly how he got me pinned me
down. I couldn't move, but anyway I kept trying to push him off, and I pulled his hair and
I hit him, and it didn't do any good. He acted
like he didn't feel anything. And then he had
intercourse with me.''
Later she also testified. ( T. 16).
'' Q. Will you tell the jury, please, how you know
that he had intercourse 'vith you?
A. I know because he had ahold of both my arms
with his hands, and he " . as laying on top of
me, and I tried to prevent it. I tried to squeeze
my legs together, and that didn't do any good.
He got his knee between my legs, and pushed
my legs apart.'' (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, she testified that the defendant pulled off the
pair of panties she was wearing. (T. 11} These were
introduced in evidence as part of Exhibit A. The elastic
band on the panties was torn and stretched, and Mrs. Pies
testified this resulted from the struggle 'vith the defendant.
On cross-examination, and in defendant's brief, much
was said about the door to the trailer being open so that
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prosecutrix could have escaped at the time of going into
the bathroom. This was still early in the encounter, and
i\[ rs. Pies testified :

"Q. Now isn't it true that, when you walked out of
the bedroom, you could have gone out this
door or out this door?
..:\. I U'asn 'f going to leave my two children in the
house U'ith him there." (Emphasis supplied)
Immediately after the act she was scared and confused
( T. 31), and consulted a doctor.

'rery shortly after the incident, only some two hours
later, in a condition that indicated to her friends that
she was upset (T. 37), she complained of the defendant's
assault upon her to a Mrs. Thelma Babcock, a close friend.
(T. 37) Mrs. Babcock testified without objection that
Mrs. Pies claimed she had been ''raped.''
The defendant testified that he lived a few hundred yards from the prosecutrix's trailer, and that on
the night of June 14, 1960, he went to Mrs Pies' trailer,
rang the doorbell and entered (T. 66) He went back into
the bedroom where the prosecutrix and her child were.
He admitted making advances to her, and admitted that
she objected. (T. 67) He then claims they engaged in
necking until ~Irs. Pies went to the bathroom. He admits
going to the bathroom to see what was taking her so long
and taking her back to the bedroom. (T. 68) He claims
they then had intercourse and he left. ( T. 69) On crossexamination the defendant admitted again that the prosecutrix denied his adYances. ( T. 71)
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No evidence was introduced showing the prosecutrix
was a woman untrue to her husband or of easy virtue,
although the defendant's girl friend, Bonnie Lee, testified that the community opinion as to l\Irs. Pies for her
chastity was not very good. ( T. 57)
Based upon the above evidence the jury returned a
verdict of guilty of rape against the defendant, and the
trial judge that conducted the trial denied a motion for
new trial. The defendant has appealed, assigning various
errors. Examination of the appellant's claim of irregularities reveals that they are totally without merit.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT I.
THE TESTIMONY OF THELMA BABCOCK
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED, AND NO
ERROR AROSE THEREFRO~I.

PoiNT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY ON THE EXTENT OF RESISTANCE
NECESSARY BY .A. FEMALE TO CONSTITUTE NON-CONSENT TO THE OFFENSE
OF RAPE.
PoiNT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING ON THE ELEMENT OF PENETRATION
IN THE CRIME OF RAPE.
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PoiNT

IV.

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S FINDING.
PoiNT

V.

THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE TESTI:\lONY OF THELMA BABCOCK
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED, AND NO
ERROR AROSE THEREFROM.
The defendant contends that the court erred in receiving the testimony of Thelma Babcock. She testified
that at approximately 6 :30 o'clock on the morning of the
15th of June, 1960, the prosecutrix came to her house in
an upset condition (T. 36, 37), and upon inquiry from
~Irs. Babcock, she stated, ''Thelma, I'm in terrible
trouble. Larry Horne entered my trailer last night
and raped me.''
No objection \\'"as made to the inquiry by counsel for
the defendant, although the question the prosecutor asked
w·as to state generally \\'"hat the prosecutrix had said.
Counsel for the defendant thereafter did not make a motion to strike, nor ask the court to instruct the jury sua
sponte to disregard the statements. Counsel thereafter
accepted the witness for cross-examination. Defendant
did not set out the claimed error as a basis for his motion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for new trial. The failure to make timely objection waives
the hearsay defect, if any there be, and renders the receipted evidence competent. In White v. Newman, 10 Utah
2d 62, 348 P. 2d 343 (1960), the present court ruled that
'' unassailed hearsay evidence'' is competent evidence.
The defendant having failed to make timely objection
must be deemed to have waived any defect in the evidence.
Moore v. United States, 56 F. 2d 764 (lOth Cir.); State v.
Karvelos, 80 N.H. 528, 120 A. 263; Abbott, Criminal Trial
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 351.
The defendant relies upon People v. Holmes, 292
Mich. 212, 290 N.W. 384 (1940) in contending that the
failure to object was not a waiver. That case is not applicable in the present situation since the court there
said:
''It is axiomatic that an objection not properly
and timely presented to the Court below will be
ignored on review and, except under unusual circumstances we have no disposition to relax this
rule." (Emphasis supplied)
The facts of the Holmes case show an attempt by
the prosecutor on cross-examination to prove similar acts
of the accused, not the subject of the instant charge. This
was the same action that was disapproved in State v.
Dickson, 11 Utah 2d ------, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961), which is
clearly absent here. In addition, the counsel in the Holmes
case filed an affidavit alleging inopportunity to object
because of the defendant's age and eagerness, a factor
also not present here. The courts have generally said
the failure to object will only be overlooked in face of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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obvious prejudice and fundamental unfairness. 4 C.J.S.,
Appeal and Error, Sec. 245; People v. Dean, 308 Ill. 74,
139 N.E. 37; People v. Holmes, supra, p. 385, N.W. Reporter. In the instant case the area of inquiry was highly
relevant to the matter of corroboration; the prosecutor
and the court had just previously cautioned the witness
to speak slowly; and the matter receipted was not additional, immaterial, prejudicial matter, but evidence corroborating what had just been related by the prosecutrix.
In addition, the defense was thoroughly apprised beforehand of what Thelma Babcock's testimony would be since
the prosecutor clearly indicated such in his opening
statement. (T. 4) For these reasons the failure to object
must waive any claimed defect, People v. Porter, 123 Cal.
App. 618, 11 P. 2d 894.
It is submitted that the evidence as presented was
admissible and proper. There is no dispute as to the rule
of law applicable to fresh complaint declarations. Generally complaints by the victim of rape made within a
reasonable time after the offense are admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Abbott, Criminal Trial
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 552. The rule has been applied in
Utah as stated in State v Christensen., 73 Utah 575, 276
P. 163 (1929) :
''The rule is well settled in this jurisdiction that,
in a prosecution for rape, testimony may be given
that the prosecutrix recently after the alleged act
complained of the outrage, to whom the complaint
was made, and where and when the crime was
committed, but that the details or particulars of
the complaint may not be given.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Utah rule has been further defined in State v.
Martinez, 7 U. 2d 387, 326 P. 2d 102 (1958), so as not to
limit it to an abstract proposition, but rather to state a
rule commensurate with the obvious expressions of persons complaining of the commission of rape. There the
Court stated, p. 390 Utah Reports:
''We believe the conversation of the prosecutrix
with a friend within hours after she had arrived
home, as related by such friend, "'"as so lacking in
details that its admission did not violate the rule
heretofore enunciated by this court to the effect
that where a woman allegedly has been unlawfully
violated sexually, any statement made by her
within a reasonably short time thereafter, is admissible if, without recitation of the details, it
refers to the commission of the offense, such statement being a spontaneous utterance whose very
spontaneity together with a characteristic, natural feminine inclination to express an outraged
feeling under such circumstances, guarantees its
trustworthiness.''
Thus the Martinez case recognized that the complaint
is not a sterile declaration, but rather ofttimes contains
identifying and factual matter. An analysis of the respondent's brief in the Martinez case (Brief 8796, Respondent, p. 17, 18, 19), shows the Yery close similarity
between the report in the instant case and that accepted
by the Court in Martinez. Under the circumstances the
declaration to Thelma Babcock 'Yas merely the natural
expression of complaint, and not the detailed recitation
of the event.
The defendant also complains it was improper to
allow Thelma Babcock to state the complaint of the proseSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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eutrix because the eomplaint named the defendant as the
assailant. Reliance is placed upon State v. Christensen,
supra, where the Court stated it is not generally competent to give testimony of the name of the person who
committed thP outrage It is doubtful whether in view of
the more practical rule laid down in State v. Martinez,
supra, if this is still the law, but even so the Court went
on to express itself beyond the rule quoted in defendant's
brief, and in so doing laid to rest any possible claim to
prejudice the defendant here may have. The Court said:
''Generally, it is not competent to give testimony
as to the name of the person or who it was that
committed the outrage upon her; but, under the
circumstances, the statement the prosecutrix made,
that the defendant 'had had sexual intercourse
\vith her,' if not competent to be given, was harmless, in view that the defendant by his testimony
admitted all of the facts and circumstances as related by the prosecutrix, except the force and violence, that he was the person with the prosecutrix,
and had sexual intercourse with her. * * * ''
Since in the instant case no issue of identity or presence
existed, the facts are \vithin the quoted exception making
the recitation harmless.
Based upon the above authorities, it is submitted that
the defendant's claim of error as to the admission of Mrs.
Babcock's testimony is significantly without merit. State
v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 123, 63 P. 2d 584.
PorNT II.

THE COURT PROPERLY IKSTRUCTED THE
JURY OX THE EXTENT OF RESISTANCE
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NECESSARY BY A FEMALE TO CONST~
TUTE NON-CONSENT TO THE OFFENSE
OF RAPE.
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury relative to. the amount of resistance
a female must use to frustrate her attacker. The instruction given must be looked upon as a whole to determine
whether it adequately appraised the jury as to the required standard, and in making an appraisal isolated
statements and paragraphs should not be singled out
for individual consideration. State v. Sweetin, 134 Kan.
663, 8 P. 2d 397; People v. Semone, 140 Cal. App. 318,35 P.
2d 379; Abbott, supra, Sec. 669.
In the instant case the Court's instruction on the
charge of rape was more than adequate to properly
apprise the jury of the applicable law. (R. 13) The jury
was clearly instructed that the crime must be committed
"against the resistance of the female," and that "proof
of resistance'' was necessary. The Court further instructed that the "nature and extent of the resistance"
must ''depend upon the surrounding circumstances.'' In
addition, the ''conduct of the female'' must be such as to
"make non-consent and actual resistOJn.ce" manifest in
accordance with all the surrounding circumstances, and
until further resistance is "useless.'' At the outset it
should be noted that this instruction is similar to those
given and approved in other jurisdictions. Ried's Branson Instructions to Juries, 3rd Ed., Vol. 5 (1960 Supp.),
Sec. 4098; Specifically see People v. Nazworth, 152 Cal.
App. 2d 790, 313 P. 2d 113. The required standard now
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generally accepted by most courts is one of reasonable
resistance under the circumstances and not the standard
upmost resistance. 1960 Annual Survey American Law,
p. 114; Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 1,
Sec. 308.
The most obvious reasons for taking a less stringent
attitude is the recognition of the fact that resistance to
the upmost may often produce serious or severe injury
and commonly death, and that to require such a standard
of resistance is often contrary to the female's actions
where it may appear that under the circumstances her
non-consent was manifest and the practicalities and the
safety of the situation demanded less than the upmost
resistance. Discretion may be the better part of valor
under such situations.
The Utah cases clearly support the more modern and
better reasoned trend, and do not require the upmost
resistance from the female. As was said in State v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P. 2d 584:
''In certain decisions the courts have stated broadly that the State must show that the female
resisted to her uttermost capacity to prevent penetration in order to show that there was no consent, and that the act was forcibly done. We think
such a rule is too strict and that the trend of the
more modern decisions is not to require such a
showing. * * * ''
Subsequently the Utah Supreme Court reiterated
its stand against the ''uttermost resistance'' theory in
State v. Beeny, 115 Utah 168, 203 P. 2d 397 (1949), and
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recognized the rule as such in State v. Ward, 10 U. 2d
34, 38 (1959) . 1
In State v. Beeny, supra, an instruction only similar
in part to that given here was presented to the jury. The
difference is that the first sentence of the instruction in
the Beeny case, which was was aspect that the Court there
found objectionable, was not given. Instead, here, it was
clearly made manifest that the degree of resistance must
depend upon the circumstances, and the woman's ability
to resist ; and that "actual resistance'' must be reasonably manifest. A much more complete instruction was
given in the instant case. This being so, the objections
found in the Beeny case are not present here. Even so, in
the B eeny case the Court did not find the instruction
itself to be error, but stated:
"We are of the opinion that the instruction given
would leave less uncertainty as to the resistance
contemplated by law, with the sentence omitted.
By so stating, however, we do not wish to be understood as holding that its inclusion was in itself
prejudicial error.''
The ratio decidendi of the Beeny case was to the effect that where the jury manifests confusion from an
instruction, the Court must instruct in such a manner as
to clear the confusion. In the instant case the record reflects none of the confusion manifest in Beeny. Also, it
should be noted that in addition to the appraisal that
1

Reliance by appellant upon State v. McCune 16 U 170 51 P.
818, is misplaced since the rule was chanaed ht Stat~ v Roberts
supra. S_tate v. Wittingh_ill, _109 Utah 48, i63 P. 2d 342 (1945), i~
not applicable to the principle for which it is cited and has no
bearing on the present issue.
'
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force was necessary in the Instruction complained of, the
Court instructed in Instructions 5, 7 and 10 ( R. 12, 15)
that it was necessary to use force, and to overcome the
prosecutrix's resistance. This clearly gave the jury the
correct standard by which to weigh the evidence
The Instruction given was in keeping with the la\v
of this jurisdiction, and similar to the rules of law
applicable in other jurisdictions. It was a correct statement of the required standard of resistance. See Wharton's, Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 1, Sec. 308.
When looking at the totality of the instructions given, it
cannot be maintained that the jury was mislead nor
that the Court committed error in its charge to the jury.
Appellant's claim on this point is without substance.
PoiNT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING ON THE ELEMENT OF PENETRATION
IN THE CRIME OF RAPE.
The appellant contends that the Court erred in instructing the jury that ''any sexual penetration, however
slight, is sufficient to constitute the act of sexual intercourse as that term is used with reference to the crime of
rape." (R. 12) Appellant contends this 'vas prejudicial
since the fact of intercourse was not in dispute. The basis
of his claim is that the instruction is abstract, and contrary to the rule espoused in State v. Marasco, 81 l 1 tah
323, 17 P. 2d 919. That case dealt not with rape, but
arson, did not concern itself 'vith the instant instruction,
and finally the principle announced therein, "that it is
erroneous to give instructions based on a state of facts
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which there is no evidence tending to prove'' is not
applicable to the instant case since both prosecution and
defense presented facts and evidence tending to prove
the act of sexual intercourse The fact that the matter was
not in dispute in no way lessens its presence before the
jury. For this reason the instruction was not rendered
in the abstract.
The instruction given by the Court covered an essential element of the crime. The crime of rape requires ''an
act of sexual intercourse.'' 76-53-15, U.C.A. 1953, and
''any sexual penetration, however slight,'' "rhen present
with other facts making out the elements of the crime is
sufficient. 75-53-17, U.C.A. 1953. Penetration is required,
and is therefore an essential element of the crime. People
v. Griffin, 117 Cal. 583, 49 Pac. 711; People v. H award,
143 Cal. 316, 76 Pac. 1116; State v. Depoister, 21 Nev.
107, 25 Pac.1000; Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure,
Vol. 1, Sec. 304.
The act of sexual penetration being an essential element was thus one which the j.ury had to find to convict
the accused. The Court had a duty to instruct upon all
.the essential elements that make up the crime charged.
75 C.J.S., Rape, Sec. 82(a). In keeping writh that requirement the Court here charged the jury on the element of
penetration. The fact that this was admitted was of no
prejudice to the accused. It is the generally stated rule
that:
"Inn prosecution for rape, the Court must properly charge as to the necessity for penetration; * * *."
(75 C.J.S., Rape, Sec. 82(b).
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The instruction given was in keeping with the above
stated general mandate. The authorities that have conHidered the possible prejudice from an instruction like
that given by the Court, where sexual intercourse was
a<lmitted, have concluded that no prejudice results. Territory v. Edie, 20 Pac. 851, 6 N.M. 555; 75 C.J.S., Rape,
Sec. 82(b).
It is not necessary to go beyond the decisions of the
Utah Supreme Court to resolve the issue against the defendant. In State v. Beeny, 115 Utah 168, 203 P. 2d 397
(1949), a similar contention was raised. There the defendant admitted intercourse with the prosecutrix and
the Court instructed on the issue of sexual intercourse.
The Supreme Court stated that although the act of intercourse was admitted, it was not prejudicial to instruct on
the matter. The Court indicated that the only danger that
might arise would be if the jury were to indicate confusion
on the amount of force necessary to constitute rape. The
Supreme Court held no error resulted, stating:
"Under the evidence, elements one and two were
not in dispute. * * * Nevertheless, error cannot
be predicated upon including elements one and two
in the charge.''
The only dispute involved in the present case was
the issue of force and resistance. On this issue the jury
was clearly instructed, and no confusion of the jury
appears of record, in any of the juror's minds as to the
issue at stake, nor does the appellant contend any existed.
The aspect of penetration being an essential element of
the offense, no error can be claimed from instructing
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thereon. Appellant's claim of error on this point is not
established.
PoiNT

IV.

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S FINDING.
The appellant contends that this Court should re·
verse the lower court's verdict because the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the conviction. In support of his
argument he contends that the testimony of the prosecutrix is inherently improbable and contradictory, and thus
requires corroboration, and that the record does not contain sufficient corroborative evidence.
Before proceeding to examine the contention, it is
well to review the position of appellate courts on the
extent to 'Yhich they will intrude into a ju.ry verdict in a
criminal case. The issue of the guilt or innocence of an
accused is primarily for the jury. In State v. Green, 78
Utah 580,6 P. 2d 177 and State v. Harris, 1 U. 2d 182,264
P. 2d 284 (1953), it was said:
"It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury
to determine the facts in all criminal cases,
whether the evidence offered by the state is
weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted * * * ''
This being the status of the jury in a criminal trial, the
verdict will not be easily set aside. Based upon the function of the jury, the C~ourt has previously said:
''With respect * * * [to] the scope of review
* * * '"f
1 tl1e ev1"d ence f avorable to the state 'Yith
all reasonable inferences and intendments th~t can
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be drawn therefrom, could sustain a verdict of
guilty the cause should be submitted to the jury.''
Thus the Court has said with reference to its power of
reversal:
''We reverse a jury verdict only where we conclude from a consideration of all of the evidence
and the inferences therefrom viewed in the light
most fa,vorable to such verdict that the findings are
unreasonable." State v. Berchtold, 11 U. 2d 208,
357 P. 2d 183 (1960). (Emphasis supplied)
::\[ost recently in a rape case, State v. Ward, supra, the
Utah Court said :
''The rules governing the scope of review on a ppeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the verdict are well settled: that it is the prerogative of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to determine the facts; that the evidence will be reviewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict; and that if when so viewed it appears that the jury acting fairly and reasonably
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. * * * ''
Only if the evidence, reviewed in a light most favorable to
the State, could be said to be so unreasonable and improbable that no reasonable jury could have found the
accused guilty, can the Court entertain a claim for reversal. To the degree that the facts supporting the conviction in the instant case are reasonable and not improbable, the appellate tribunal should affirm .
..:\.s to the issue of the necessity for corroboration of
the testimony of a prosecutrix, the rule is clear that corroboration is not necessarily a requirement. As was
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stated in State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P. 2d 211
(1952):
''There is without doubt wisdom in recognizing
the danger of conviction of a sex crime upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix and
of viewing the same with caution as suggested in
Morris v. State, supra. Yet if the law did not permit conviction on such testimony, the guilty would
often go unpunished. Seldom are such deeds perpetrated in the presence of others. Where there is
nothing inherently unreasonable or improbable in
her testimony, it alone may support a conviction
if the jury finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.''
In State v. Diamond, 50 Nev. 433, 264 Pac. 687, it 'vas
said:
''There is no rule requiring the testimony of a
prosecutrix in a rape case to be corroborated. It
is sufficient, standing alone, to sustain a conviction.''
Unless the testimony of the prosecutrix is inherently
improbable, it requires no corroboration. State v. Hillard,
______ Ariz. ______ , 359 P. 2d 66 ( 1961).
It is submitted that on the question of sufficiency of
evidence, the defendant has erred in three particulars.
(1) He has not appraised the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict; (2) He has found supposed improbabilities in the testimony of the prosecutrix by
accepting the defendant's testimony where conflict exists;
(3) He has failed to note that the record does corroborate

the testimony of the prosecutrix.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

In the instant case the outrage of Mrs. Pies is not
even remotely in dispute. She constailtly maintained that
the resultant intercourse was over her objection. (T. 9, 10,
11, 12). At no point in her testimony can any inference

of consent be found. After the act she made it clear that
she was outraged and expressly told the accused to ''get
out'' and that she ''never wanted to see him again.''
(T. 13) This is corroborated by the testimony of the
defendant, who claimed the act to be consentual, for
he testified that the prosecutrix wanted him to leave. ( T.
69) The first person the prosecutrix saw the next morning made it clear that Mrs. Pies was upset, and related
a complaint of rape. ( T. 35) The prosecutrix testified
that she fully resisted the advances of the accused. She
made full and reasonable effort to deter his actions. There
is nothing in Mrs. Pies' testimony that can be deemed
inherently improbable or untruthful.
It is contended that the prosecutrix could have
effected her escape when she passed an open door on her
\vay to the bathroom. It should be recalled that this was
early in the encounter, and the defendant's actions had
not reached the violent pitch to which they later rose. It
certainly is not unreasonable to expect that a woman
'vould reluctantly leave her home, and the action of pretending to be locked in the bathroom is certainly believable and foreseeable. Very possibly a delay might cause
the attacker to cool off and think rationally. The most
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reasonable explanation for Mrs. Pies' action was given
by herself. (T. 23) :

"Q. Now isn't it true that, when you walked out
of the bedroom, you could have gone out this
door or out this door~
A. I wasn't going to leave my two children in
the house with him there." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the answer is more in keeping with any rational
explanation than the argument made against it. Courts
have long recognized that women may be willing to forego their own safety because of a concern for their children. Hallmark v. State, 22 Okla. Crim. 422, 212 Pac. 322
(1923). In United States v. Daniels, 12 CMR 442 (1953),
the Court clearly recognized the reasonableness of such
action, saying:
' ' * * * in view of the strong protective instincts
of a mother for the life of her newborn child the
mother may have been impelled by subjective fear
to submit against her will to such acts even if such
submission was more for the purposes of protecting her child than for the purpose of saving herself. She is to be commended for her conduct in
protecting her offspring and her conduct cannot be
said to constitute that species of consent ''Thich
will render the accused's acts guiltless.''
The prosecutrix had previously been concerned by
the crying of her child, (T. 11) and after being dragged
into the bedroom, still expressed concern for the safety
of her little girl. (T. 12) Under these circumstances the
conduct of the prosecutrix was "~holly reasonable and
proper. No merit exists in any argument to the contrary.
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The claim that the prosecutrix admitted any unfaithfulness or unchastity is a misstatement of the evidence.
~Irs. Pies completely denied having any sexual relations
with anyone other than her husband (T. 32, 33) and
expressly denied the inference in the testimony of Bonnie
Lee to such acts. (T. 76) The jury heard all the witnesses and could believe whom they desired. It is not
surprising they should choose not to believe Bonnie Lee,
for her testimony appears biased even from the cold
record, and she admitted being defendant's lover. (T. 58)
The jury was free to appraise the demeanor of the witnesses and believe whom they desired. Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 1395. Their conclusion was proper,
and it cannot be said to be unreasonable.
The defendant contends that the prosecutrix made no
outcry, and delayed reporting the incident and, therefore,
her story is so unbelievable as to require reversal. The
defendant contends that the prosecutrix waited some 24
hours later to report the incident. This is not so. If we
assume the defendant's testimony to be true that he left
at 4 :00-4 :30 in the morning, then the prosecutrix made
her complaint to the first person she talked with only two
hours later. (T. 35) At about 6:30 she entered the home
of her friend, Thelma Babcock, who noticed that she was
upset, and there she complained she had been ''raped.''
Thus the very first person she confronted she complained
to. What more proper person to relate the truth to than
a close friend and confidant' This was a fresh complaint,
and as such \vas also corroboration of her testimony.
\Vharton 's Criminal Evidence, 13th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 678.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

The most logical reason for such evidence is that ''it indicates the truth of the charge, and is corroborative
thereof.'' Wharton, op. cit.; State v. Imlay, 22 Utah 156,
61 Pac. 557 (1900). The close similarity between the
corroborative declarations found proper in State v. Martinez and those present here should be noted. The fact
that the police were not immediately informed is not so
unreasonable, when it is noted that the victim made almost
immediate complaint, and then went to the doctor. Many
women are assaulted and do not report the matter at all
because of the embarrassment and stigma associated with
it. The desire to be free from disease or an unwanted
child may weigh as heavily as the need to have the attacker punished. The unfortunate position of the rape
victim faced with the need to make disclosure and the
humiliation connected therewith has been noted by Sutherland and Cressey in their excellent work, Principles of
Criminology, 5th Ed., p. 21:
''The loss of status in the community is frequently
a result of crime The victim of rape, especially,
suffers this loss, and the loss is immensely magnified by the continued publicity given to it in the
newspapers.''
The fact that a woman is reluctant to call police or
friends and submit to the attack upon her character is
not surprising. In this case, however, Mrs. Pies did complain, and did subject herself to such harrassing, which
certainly corroborates her story and indicates that ·w·hat
she says happened actually took place. State v. Tr ard, 10
U. 2d 34, 347 P. 2d 865 (1959). Courts have held delavs of
the nature made here to be well within the bounds of
ol
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reason. DeSalvo v. People, 98 Colo. 368, 56 P. 2d 28
(1936). Commowwealth v. Ellis, 319 Mass. 677, 67 N.E. 2d
2R4; Commonwealth v. Krick, 164 Pa. Super 516, 67 A. 2d
746; Lewis v. State, 226 S.W. 2d 861 (Tex. Cr. App.).
Also for a similar complaint, People v. Ristau, 363 Ill.
583, 2 N.E. 2d 833. In the instant case the complaint was
timely under the circumstances, and the actions of the
prosecutrix were not inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant. In any event the ''truth of the charge'' is for
the jury, Clark v. State, 28 Ala. App. 448, 186 So. 778. The
prosecutrix made complaint shortly after the crime,
sought medical assistance and then called the police, all
reasonable actions.
The defendant's assertion that the prosecutrix did
nothing about being scantily clad is ignoring her testimony to the contrary. The prosecutrix testified that she
attempted to put on her peddle pushers, but that the defendant prevented her. (T. 24) In addition she sought the
refuge and sanctuary of the bathroom, all to no avail.
The defendant apparently would require a showing
of severe injury or the upmost resistance. Indeed, herein
is where his cited authorities fail to support his contention for they appear to support such a rule, whereas
the Utah requirement is one of reasonableness under the
circumstances. State v. Roberts, supra. The female need
not show great wounds or bruises- "It is not necessary
to show that a woman was butchered or brutally beaten to
eorroborate her testimony of resistance to such an attack." State v. Ward, supra. Indeed, in the instant case
the circumstances show a struggle, and the torn and
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stretched panties clearly corroborate the prosecutrix. If
she were to lie about this, why not say all the holes in
the clothing were the result of the struggle~ In the instant
case the evidence, when viewed most favorable to the
verdict, shows that the prosecutrix struggled until subdued; that she attempted to evade the defendant and
pleaded with him, both for herself and to stop ''hurting
her little girl''; that her clothing was torn, that her most
immediate neighbor and friend was in the hospital and
no one appeared to whom she could make outcry, that
the next morning she was upset and disturbed and made
immediate complaint. All these factors, when viewed
against the appellate requirements for sufficiency,
strongly demonstrate the absence of merit in the defendant's contentions. Cases less flagrant than the present
one have been affirmed on appeal. MO!YIJn.ing v. State, 93
So. 2d 716 (Fla.); Perry v. State, 80 N.W. 2d 699 (Neb.);
.A.ndrews v. Sta.te, 289 S.W. 2d 262 (Tex.); People v. Fremont, 47 Cal. App. 2d 341, 117 P. 2d 891; United States Y.
Wright, 5 CMR 323.
Based upon the evidence, it is submitted that the jury,
acting within their province as finders of the fact, acted
reasonably and based upon eYidence neither uncertain nor
inherently improbable. The defendant's argument on the
sufficiency of the evidence will not support reversal.

V.
THE COtTRT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S l\fOTION FOR .A. NEW TRIAL.
PoiNT

The totality of the evidence and the record sho\\~s
without question that the accused was afforded a fair
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and adequate trial. The evidence is more than sufficient
to sustain the conviction, and nowhere in the record can
it be said that the cumulative effect of the trial was such
as to compel a finding that it was not commensurate with
due process of law. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319.

CONCLUSION
The jury found the appellant guilty after a fair and
proper trial. They were adequately instructed on the
law, the evidence, the presumption of innocence and requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (T. 81).
In addition, it must be remembered that the jury had the
opportunity to view the witnesses, to contrast their size
and strength, and to denote their demeanor. 2 As was said
by Justice Frank in Broadcast Music v. Havan.a Madrid
Restwurant Corp., 175 F. 2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.):

"* * * For the demeanor of an orally-testifying
"~itness

is 'always assumed to be in evidence.' It
is 'wordless language.' The liar's story may seem
uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it
may be 'contradicted' in the trial court by his
manner, his intonations, his grimaces, his gestures,
and the like - all matters which 'cold print does
not preserve' and 'vhich constitute 'list evidence'
2

Many places in the record indicate that the defendant's demeanor
and flipancy may have been a relevant factor. For example
(T. 71):

"Q. And you had intercourse with this girl, with her consent?
A. The way she acted, yes.
Q. And during all of this time you didn't once kiss her on
mouth?

A. No.
Q. Doesn't that strike you as unusual?
A. No. I'm not in love with her."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

so far as an upper court is concerned. For such a
court, it has been said, even if it were called a 'rehearing court, ' is not a 'reseeing court. ' Only were
we to have 'talking movies' of trials could it be
otherwise. A 'stenographic transcript correct in
every detail fails to reproduce tones of voice and
hesitations of speech that often make a sentence
mean the reverse of what the words signify. The
best and most accurate record is like a dehydrated
peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor
of the fruit before it was dried.' It resembles a
pressed flower. The witness' demeanor, not apparent in the record, may alone have 'impeached'
him. * * *"
Under the circumstances, the jury had available to
them much that may have persuaded them of the defendant's guilt. Their verdict was one reasonable under the
circumstances, and the trial was free of prejudicial error.
Therefore, the verdict must be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attornev General
RONALD N BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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